In cloud environment, profile matching is a key technique in applications such as health care and social networks. Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) is a suitable technique for data sharing in such environments. In this paper, we propose an asymmetric pairing based Hierarchical Multi-Authority CP-ABE (HM-CP-ABE) construction for profile matching. We utilize the fast Ate pairing to make the proposed HM-CP-ABE scheme efficient. The performance analysis of the proposed scheme shows improved efficiency in terms of computational costs for initialization, key generation and encryption using ELiPS library when compared with existing works.
ment and performance bottleneck problem. To overcome the above mentioned problems, Luo et al. [4] proposed a Hierarchical Multi-Authority Ciphertext Policy ABE (HM-CP-ABE) for key management based on Shamir secret sharing scheme to avoid key leakage because of multiple user's key sharing in addition to ruling out of single point failure and performance bottleneck problem. They use symmetric pairing for HM-CP-ABE construction. Yang et al. [7] proposed a scheme to improve privacy and security in decentralizing multi-authority attribute-based encryption in cloud computing. Most often existing ABE schemes are constructed from bilinear pairings which makes an algorithm inefficient due to the high computational complexity of bilinear pairing. Therefore, the main focus of this paper is reducing the computation cost of bilinear pairing operations to improve the efficiency of the HM-CP-ABE scheme.
A. Our Contributions
The contributions of this paper are highlighted as follows: 1. We propose a more efficient HM-CP-ABE which is based on an asymmetric pairing construction that eliminates the key leakage issue, single point failure and performance bottleneck problem. 2. We apply fast Ate pairing [8] in this asymmetric pairing based HM-CP-ABE construction to reduce its computational costs for initialization, key generation and encryption and then compared with HM-CP-ABE [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] .
B. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II deals with the preliminaries. Section III explains with fast Ate pairing. Section IV explains the system model. Section V presents the proposed HM-CP-ABE scheme based on asymmetric pairing using Section III. Section VI presents with the experimental results and discussions. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Shamir's secret sharing scheme
Shamir's secret sharing scheme, for -out-of-secret sharing [9] consists of the following steps. 
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First, choose a large prime , and let field = ℤ ℤ ⁄ . To share secret as ⟹ ( 1 , 2 , … , ) do the following:
1. Choose coefficients 1 , … , −1 ∈ ℤ ℤ ⁄ , which are to be the coefficients of degree − 1 polynomial .
Let
3. Give ( ) to party , = 1,2, … , .
Second, when parties have a secret, then we have points on the curve ( − 1) degree polynomial, so by the fact above, we get unique coeffecients to a degree ( − 1) polynomial. The secret is coefficient 0 .
Formalizing, we use Lagrange Interpolation over a finite field. Given ( , ) for ∈ , ⊆ {1,2, … , },
This is a linear system in unknowns, the coefficients , with equations. The existence of a unique solution is guaranteed by the fact stated above. So Gaussian elimination can be used to solve. Then,
Letting ∏ − − ∈ , ≠ = , we have that = ∑ ∈ . Note that is a constant independent of 's. Thus we can compute , ∈ ahead of time without knowing the 's, and then in linear time can find , the secret, once we have the 's. So recoverability is quite efficient in this case.
Based on the Shamir's secret sharing properties we can ensure that recovering of shares to get the secret, no − 1 shares provide any information about the secret. Therefore schemes using Shamir's secret sharing properties have computational security.
B. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption
Let a, b, c, z ∈ ℤ be chosen at random, be the group of prime order and is the generator of the group . DBDH problem [10] is a problem that no polynomial time adversary is able to distinguish the tuple ( a , b , c , e( , ) abc ) from the tuple ( a , b , c , e( , ) z ) with a non-negligible advantage. This can be formalized as follows: 
III. FAST ATE PAIRING
Nogami et al., [8] proposed a faster Ate pairing of embedding degree 12 as follows:
are the two source groups and satisfies | ( 12 − 1) and ∤ ( − 1), < 12. [ ] be the set oftorsion points of . Let [1] and [ ] denote the and times of scalar multiplications for a rational point respectively. The Frobenius endomorphism ∅ is defined as ∅ : ⟶ , ( , ) ⟼ ( , ). Let 1 ⊂ ( ) and 2 ⊂ ( 12 )[ ] be the two source groups, = − 1, where denotes the Frobenius trace of ( ). It satisfies the bilinearity and Nondegeneracy properties. The Ate pairing is defined as follows:
A. Sextic Twist
The sextic twist is based on Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve which is a class of non-supersingular pairing friendly curves. The BN curve is defined as / : 2 = 3 + , ∈ ( ) with embedding degree 12. The characteristic and Frobenius trace are given by ( ) = 36 4 − 36 3 + 24 2 − 6 + 1 and ( ) = 6 2 + 1 respectively. Let be an integer. The sextic twisted curve over 2 is given by ′ / 2 : 2 = 3 + / , where is a quadratic and cubic non-residue in 2 .
The isomorphism is defined as
Nogami et al., [8] used an isomorphic substitution from 2 ⊂ ( 12 ) into 2 ′ in subfield-twisted elliptic curve ′ ( 2 ). It speeds up scalar multiplications over 2 and eliminates denominator calculations in Miller's algorithm. Fast Ate pairing proposed by Nogami et al., [8] improves Miller's algorithm about 30% than BKLS algorithm [11] using proper subfield arithmetic operations. Nogami et al., [8] computes the total cost of Ate pairing in 5.16 ms and 13.3 ms for the size of as 158 bit and 254 bit respectively. 
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model of profile matching process is shown in Fig. 1 . The system model consists of Cloud Server (CS), Trusted Authority (TA), Attribute Authority (AA), data owner (Alice) and data consumer (Bob). This scheme consists of one fully trusted and honest-but-curious. The CS stores the encrypted data about user's information which includes name, gender, photo, video, contact, hobbies and so on. TA is authoritative for the initialization phase and the key generation phase, access policy distribution for each AA, approval and administration of subordinate AA. Every AA is authoritative for the administration of part attribute set and subordinate AA and authoritative for the key generation and distribution. The system model is used as hierarchical structure of multiauthority [4] scheme. The TA is the highest hierarchy and other AAs are lower hierarchy. Data consumer can decrypt the data or message only if his/her attributes satisfies the access policy.
V. PROPOSED HM-CP-ABE
Fast Ate pairing algorithm [8] is applied in the proposed asymmetric pairing based HM-CP-ABE constructions. Let bilinear map : 1 × 2 → , 1 2 be the bilinear groups of prime order . Let 1 and 2 be the generators of groups 1 2 respectively. The will allot a unique Global Identifier ( ) and Assign an Identifier ( ) for all users and each respectively. Usually is a digital signature string and verified by all s and cannot be obtained illegally.
: This algorithm is executed by the and randomly chooses the parameter and { 1 , 2 , … , } ∈ ℤ , where is number of recursive times in key structure. It produces public key ( ) and master secret key ( ) as the output which is calculated in (6) and (7) as follows: 
After , suppose manages the attribute set ∧= { 0 , 1 , 2 , … , }, where 0 is the first layer attribute, is the second layer attribute (i.e., = 2), , is the ℎ attribute in the attribute set , is the number of attributes in the attribute set . The master key of the level 1of is calculated in (8) as follows: 
where ∈ ℤ is used to represent ∧ and , ∈ ℤ is used to represent , ∈ (0 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m) and is used to convert node and decrypt cross set matching for attributes. The sub is authorized by level 1
. The master key of + 1 is calculated in (9) as follows:
where the attribute set of Sub is ∧⊂∧, ̃∈ ℤ is used to represent ∧ and ̃, ∈ ℤ is used to represent ̂, ∈ (0 ≤ ≤ , 1 ≤ ≤ ) and is used to convert node and decrypt cross set matching for attributes.
: The Alice master key is computed as follows:
where is used to meet the Alice access structure to decrypt the file.
is issued by the .
:
generates the access tree ( ) which is based on the characteristics of Alice attributes to . From the root R in , every node ( ) in ( ) has a corresponding polynomial . The order of is calculated as follows:
where ( ) be the parent of node ( ) and ( ) returns the unique value associated with node ( ) .
The ciphertext is calculated as follows: where ( ( ) ) be the attributes linked with the leaf node in ( ) . Alice finally gets the ciphertext of message and access policy after calculating the ciphertext of − 1 which is similar to the ciphertext: 
Through upward recursion, we can obtain the value of ( , ( ) , , ) of root as follows:
. , ≠ 0
where ≠ 0, the transformation of ( ) is:
If the user Bob satisfies the access policy of , which means { ( ) } =1 has no null values, then the computation is as follows:
The plaintext after decryption is as follows: A. Proposed Scheme: Proof of Security A proof of security of the proposed scheme has been recently reported in [10] and is here repeated for the sake of clarity.
Theorem 1: If an adversary can break our construction with non-negligible advantage in the security model under Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption, then a simulator can be constructed to solve the DBDH problem.
Proof. The security game is based on the hardness of the DBDH assumption. Suppose attacker can win the FH-CP-ABE game with advantage . We construct a simulator that can distinguish a DBDH tuple from a random tuple with advantage 2
. Let 1 and 2 are a source group and is a target group. Let 1 and 2 are generators of 1 and 2 respectively. The challenger chooses the fair binary coin ɦ ∈ {0,1}, 1 ∈ 1 , 2 ∈ 2 , ∈ and , , ∈ ℤ . If ɦ = 0, then the challenger defines to be ( 1 , 2 ) . Otherwise, he sets = ( 1 , 2 ) . The challenger then gives the simulator the DBDH details and then simulator now plays the role of challenger in the security game.
Init: During the init phase, receives the challenge access structure * from attacker .
Setup:
To provide a public key to , randomly chooses ′ ∈ ℤ and note = ′ + . It calculates guess that = ( 1 , 2 ) . Otherwise, is a random target group element in .
The advantage of the attacker is , when = ( 1 , 2 ) .
The advantage of the attacker is 1 2 , when is a random target group element in .
Finally, the advantage of the simulator in this security game is 2 .
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we show the computation cost of initialization phase, key generation phase and encryption for the proposed HM-CP-ABE scheme in cloud environment. We implemented the proposed HM-CP-ABE scheme based on the ELiPS [8] pairing library and GMP6.0.0 library and using the GCC4.8.2 compiler. The implementation uses a Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve which is class of a non-supersingular pairing friendly curves 2 = 3 + , ∈ ( ) with embedding degree 12. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 . The number of attributes used in the simulation are {20,40,60,80,100}.
As illustrated in Fig. 2 , the proposed scheme reduces the computational cost for initialization phase and we can also show that the results are slightly increasing and approximately following a linear relationship with the number of attributes. The initialization phase is associated with the hierarchical structure of authority and number of attributes handled by AA. The schemes [5] , [6] adopt the accountability mechanism that utilizes bilinear mappings multiple times. As we have shown in Fig. 2 , when the number of attributes are varied, the initialization time of proposed work is less than [4] , [5] , [6] and [7] . As illustrated in Fig. 3 , the proposed scheme reduces the computational cost for key generation phase and we can also show that the results are gradually increasing and approximately following a linear relationship with the number of attributes. As in [4] , each AA handles certain number of attributes. It reduces the complexity of attributes management.
In schemes [5] , [6] , all attributes are managed by one authority which is responsible for key generation, thus their computation time is larger. As we have shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , when we varied the number of attributes, the key generation time and encryption time of the proposed work is less than [4] , [5] , [6] and [7] respectively. As in [4] , the proposed HM-CP-ABE scheme reduces the workload and communication cost since all pairing operations are computed in server and data owner update their own attributes in AA only, rather than in the entire attribute sets. The results show that the proposed HM-CP-ABE scheme enhances the efficiency and provide fine grained access control in cloud environment. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a more efficient asymmetric pairing based Hierarchical Multi-Authority CP-ABE (HM-CP-ABE) construction for profile matching. We utilized fast Ate pairing [5] which was based on a Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve with embedding degree 12. It also speeds up scalar multiplications and eliminates denominator calculations in Miller's algorithm. The proposed HM-CP-ABE scheme is then compared with existing schemes [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . The experimental results show a mitigation in terms of computational costs for initialization, key generation and encryption.
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